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1
The Moral-Hazard Effect of Liquidated Damages:
An Experiment on Contract Remedies
by
Sven Hoeppner, Lars Freund, and Ben Depoorter *
Recent evidence suggests that liquidated-damages clauses provide efficiency
advantages by crowding out contracting parties’ deontological concerns about
efficient breach. In this paper we highlight an important downside to damage stip-
ulations by parties. Based on findings obtained in a controlled laboratory exper-
iment, we suggest that express damage stipulations trigger negative reciprocity
and moral hazard, reducing performance by contract promisors. Such negative ef-
fects are absent when damages are exogenously imposed. Moreover, our results
indicate that when stipulating damages, contract parties attain less cooperative
surplus than when they are subject to an exogenously imposed remedy. Princi-
pals, not agents, bear this loss. (JEL: J, E, L, K12, D63, D86, L14, C25, C70,
C91)
1 Introduction
The economic literature on contract law has identified various benefits of party-
stipulated remedies. Early contributions recognize liquidated damages as enabling
contracting parties to signal the actual value of their goods and services and provide
efficient insurance for their preferences (Goetz and Scott, 1977; Kronman and Pos-
ner, 1979; Schwartz, 1990; Talley, 1994).1 Party-stipulated awards are heralded
also as an instrument that can be used by contracting parties to induce efficient
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Studies in Law and Economics (CASLE), Ghent University, Belgium, and affiliate re-
searcher at the Department for Business, Economics, and Social Sciences, University of
Cologne, Germany; Lars Freund: research fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Re-
search on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany; Ben Depoorter: Professor of Sunderland
Chair at Hastings College of Law, University of California, San Francisco (CA), U.S.A.,
director of CASLE, Ghent University, Belgium, and affiliate scholar at the Center for In-
ternet & Society, Stanford Law School, Berkeley (CA), U.S.A. We are grateful for helpful
discussions and critical comments by Christoph Engel, Andreas Engert, Paul Heald, An-
dré Schmelzer, Alexander Stremitzer, and Theresa Wenning. We are also indebted to the
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1 For experimental findings, see Sloof et al. (2003).
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investments (Edlin, 1996; Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996; Hart and Moore, 1999;
Maskin and Tirole, 1999).
A strand of scholarship focuses on the beneficial effects of contemplating and
expressing damage remedies ex ante (Rea, 1984; Stole, 1992; Spier and Whinston,
1995). In particular, formalizing damage awards forces parties to deliberate care-
fully about the expected value of and the potential risks presented by the contract.2
Several valuable recent contributions focus on the effect of party-stipulated reme-
dies on the interpersonal dynamics between contracting parties. Experimental ev-
idence shows that subjects set the penalties for breach at lower amounts when
asked to draft a liquidated-damages clause ex ante than when asked to determine
the appropriate level of damages for breach ex post (Wilkinson-Ryan and Baron,
2009). The express stipulation of damage remedies in case of breach has also been
found to change the meaning of performance and moral intuitions about breach.
By contemplating compensation prior to breach, liquidated-damages stipulations
avoid moral outrage of contract breach between contracting parties. This may pro-
mote efficiency because, as shown by recent empirical evidence, the presence of
liquidated-damages clauses can crowd out contracting parties’ concerns about effi-
cient contract breaches (Wilkinson-Ryan, 2010).
This article identifies a hereto unexplored downside of contract for damage
remedies. We argue that explicitly designating damage awards ex ante may neg-
atively affect cooperation and performance. Specifically, we conjecture that by
specifying the rights and obligations of the agent in the event of contract breach,
liquidated-damages clauses trigger negative reciprocity. In this process, resentment
over the principal’s express stipulation of damages may induce lower overall per-
formance by the agent than when the sanction for breach is set exogenously by
courts.
We examine our intuition by deriving predictions from a formal model and
testing the ensuing predictions in a controlled laboratory experiment. Following
the modeling framework of Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007), we assume that
agents are egocentric altruists. Employing a modified trust game, we apply a set of
treatments to distinguish the effects of various contract remedies, including expec-
tation damages (with varying levels of uncertainty about the damage award) and
liquidated damages.
The main findings can be summarized as follows. First, the results confirm that,
as compared to expectation damages set exogenously, agents perform at lower lev-
els when a principal has stipulated damages. Second, our data suggests that, based
on their investment decisions, principals do not appear to anticipate moral hazard
as triggered by stipulating damages. Third, the role of negative reciprocity in driv-
ing moral hazard on behalf of agents is confirmed by our finding that performance
is unaffected when damage remedies are imposed exogenously in the experiment.
2 But see Eisenberg (1995) for a critical evaluation of the ex ante ability of parties to
imagine all possible situations involving breach.
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Overall, our findings provide a cautionary note about the alleged efficiency ad-
vantages of party-designated damages. Although stipulating damages may remove
moral inhibitions about breach when there are efficient breach opportunities, this
benefit must be weighed against the reduced cooperation and the quality of per-
formance due to negative reciprocity and the lack of interpersonal trust. Moreover,
liquidated damages induce inefficient, excessive investments, since principals fail
to anticipate the reduced performance by agents in response to stipulated damages.
This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the experiment, includ-
ing treatments, procedure, and participant sample. Section 3 outlines the model
predictions and various hypotheses. Section 4 presents the results. In section 5
we discuss the policy implications before we conclude. Appendices and supple-
mentary material are available online at http://www.coll.mpg.de/sites/www/files/
HFD-JITE-appendices.zip.
2 Game Setup and Experiment
To examine the effects of party-designated and court-imposed contract remedies,
we employ a modified version of the trust game. Figure 1 depicts the base game,
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In this sequential game, the principal (P) moves first by deciding whether to
invest in a project, aP 2 ¹in;outº, that an agent (A) will execute. If P selects aP D out,
no contract is agreed upon and P and A receive outside option payoffs OP and OA,
respectively. The outside option payoffs correspond to the players’ endowments at
the outset of the game. If P selects aP D in, P forms a contract with A to carry out a
3 See Appendix B (online) for the full parametrization in all treatments.
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project. P pays a fixed wage w to A and in turn receives the benefits of the project.
A moves second by selecting his costly effort level aA 2 ¹e0;e1;e2;e3;e4º. We denote
A’s effort costs with ‰.aA/ and assume ‰0./ > 0, ‰00./ > 0 (convexity). A’s choice
is unobservable.
Similarly to Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), the project stochastically gen-
erates payoff for P. Two states of the world, s 2 ¹S;F º, can occur. If the project
succeeds (s D S), P receives profit …SP . If the project fails (s D F ), however, P ob-




P , …P D …SP …FP . The probability of success
depends on how much effort A invests. With probability ProbŒs D S D q.aA/ the
project succeeds. The more effort A invests in the task, the higher the probability
of success, i.e., q0.aA/ > 0. Due to the stochastic nature of the project, …P is an
imperfect signal for A’s effort choice. Therefore, A’s effort level is not contractible.
We use this modified trust game because it captures essential elements of a real-
world contract. P and A can realize a cooperative surplus. P pays a wage, and A
invests effort in the completion of the transaction. If they do not form a contract,
each party only receives the low outside option payoff. Therefore, rational parties
would want to credibly commit. Moreover, exchange is deferred in that completing
the transaction involves the passage of time. The passage of time between commit-
ment and response creates uncertainty and risk. Specifically, A’s action in response
the P’s commitment is not contractible, because A’s effort is unobservable and the
outcome is only an imperfect signal for A’s effort choice. Therefore, A has an in-
centive to behave opportunistically after concluding the contract (moral hazard).
P may foresee this and, in turn, decide not to cooperate at all.
2.1 Treatments
In a baseline treatment (BASE), participants play the pure game as described. Play-
ers can earn points by playing the game. The parametrization of the game corre-
sponds to Figure 1. BASE provides a benchmark for effort choices of players A
and investment choices of players P, absent remedies.
In a next treatment, we implement a liquidated-damages mechanism. This liqui-
dated-damages treatment (LDT) modifies BASE by expanding the choices of
player P. Before P makes her investment decision, she can stipulate to enforce a
transfer payment of 400 points from A in case the low payoff occurs. Therefore,
LDT contains two additional moves for P. First, prior to making her investment de-
cision, P decides whether to stipulate the transfer payment.4 Second, if a low payoff
occurs following A’s effort decision, P decides whether to enforce the previously
4 Note that we assume unilateral damage stipulation. In many instances, parties of
course negotiate about a liquidated-damages clause. As a liquidated-damages clause func-
tions like an insurance for the promisee, a rational promisor may ask for an insurance
premium. Consequently, the price for the promisor’s services would increase. However,
when there is imbalance in bargaining power, the contract can have a take-it-or-leave-it
character: either the promisor accepts the contract with the liquidated-damages clause or
not at all. We assume such an extreme distribution of bargaining power in order to sustain
a tractable model and a clean implementation in the experiment.
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stipulated transfer payment. Before A decides on effort, she observes whether P
stipulated a transfer payment. Then A makes her effort decision as in BASE, with a
potentially pending decision of P to enforce a transfer payment. Note that the trans-
fer payment of 400 points is an expectation damages measure. Absent remedies
(BASE), the expected value of selecting aP D in is 600 points. However, P receives
200 points even if the project fails. Therefore, the transfer of 400 points protects
P’s anticipated interest from the completion of the project.
In an additional treatment, we implement regular court-imposed damages. In
this regular damages treatment (RDT), we also expand the choices of player P.
Specifically, P decides whether to claim a transfer payment from player A after
player A maintains her effort level and the low payoff occurs. In contrast to LDT,
player P cannot stipulate the transfer payment in advance. Rather, the possibility of
claiming a transfer payment is provided exogenously. Regarding the amount of the
transfer in RDT, we incorporate a prominent aspect of damage awards: perfectly
compensatory damages are difficult to assess, and thus the award can be under-
or overcompensatory. To capture this real-life feature of court-imposed damage
awards, P’s decision to claim a transfer payment triggers the lottery (300, 0.5; 500).
Compared to the expectation damage measure of 400 points, a transfer payment of
300 points is undercompensatory and a transfer payment of 500 is overcompen-
satory. Both outcomes are equally likely.
Note that our attempt to distinguish the different effects of stipulated and regular
damages faces the following identification problem: while the remedy in LDT is
party-designated (endogenous) and fixed, the remedy in RDT is exogenously im-
posed and risky. We address this problem by using a fourth treatment that is similar
to RDT except that the potential transfer is fixed at 400 points. This fixed-damages
treatment (FDT) facilitates disentangling the effects between LDT and RDT.
Finally, tentative observable differences in A’s behavior between BASE and all
remedy treatments are confounded insofar as the transfer potentially reduces A’s
payoff, while enlarging P’s expected payoff. The payoff reduction as such creates
an economic incentive for A. However, A’s effort decision may also depend on how
he cares about other people. To disentangle the effects of remedies on standard and
other-regarding preferences, we implement a no-transfer treatment (NTT). In NTT,
A still receives her wage of 500 points. However, if the project fails and P receives
the low payoff, A suffers a payoff reduction of 400. The points are not transferred
from A to P. This reduction is neither designated nor claimed by P. Rather, the re-
duction is automatically imposed by the experimenter. Therefore, anticipating the
“remedy” will only affect A’s standard preferences concerning his own payoff; it
will not affect A’s preferences regarding the payoff of P. Note that we did not make
this payoff reduction contingent on any decisions by P. Such a design choice would
resemble punishment of A by P. With an automatic trigger, we avoid replacing A’s
other-regarding preferences by her beliefs about P’s punishment behavior. This de-
sign choice comes at a potential cost, however. Differences in A’s effort choices
between NTT and, for instance, FDT may be caused by the transfer nature of the
remedy and/or by P’s decision to claim that remedy. Both are absent in NTT. How-
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ever, seeing that the decision to claim the remedy is a strictly dominant strategy
for P, we do not think that A will reasonably expect that P will not claim the rem-
edy.5 Therefore, we do not expect any effect from A making his effort decision
before knowing whether P triggers the transfer.
2.2 Procedure
We conducted our experiment at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research
in May and June 2016. We used z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) to program the ex-
periment. The experiment consisted of 10 sessions, and no subjects participated in
more than one session. On average, a session lasted 29.60 minutes, and participants
earned 9.59 EUR. The final payoff consisted of a show-up fee of 4 EUR in addition
to a participant’s incentive-compatible earnings from the experiment.
We randomly assigned participants to treatments. When participants arrived in
the laboratory, they sat down in their separate cubicles, where they received the
instructions for the first part of the experiment. We instructed participants not to
communicate, randomly assigned participants to roles of player P and player A,
and randomly paired players P with players A. Upon reading the instructions, par-
ticipants could raise their hand so that one of the experimenters could come over
and answer any questions a participant might have.
The instructions for the first part informed participants about the choices of the
players, the sequence of the choices, how choices influenced the points that could
be accumulated, and how points translated into payoffs at the end of the experiment
(200 points D 1 EUR).6 Participants also learned that they were randomly paired
with another participant and that all choices would remain completely anonymous.
Finally, the instructions mentioned that instructions for the second part of the ex-
periment would be announced once the first part of the experiment was completed.
When the first part commenced, each participant learned about her role and
played the modified trust game in her role and treatment condition. Note that play-
ers A made conditional effort choices for each possible information set. That is,
we employed the strategy method to elicit effort choices of players A outside the
actual course of play (Selten, 1967; Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993).
Following the first part of the experiment, we elicited participants’ risk attitudes
(Holt and Laury, 2002), measured their ambiguity aversion (Gneezy, Imas, and
List, 2015), and determined their social-value orientation (Crosetto, Weisel, and
Winter, 2012). Instructions for these posttests followed on screen. All posttests
were incentivized.
5 In fact, in the experiment only 2 out of 157 players P ever abstained from claiming
the transfer when the low payoff occurred.
6 See Appendix A (online) for full text instructions translated from German to English.
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2.3 Sample
We used ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) to invite a total of 320 participants consisting
of 64 participants per treatment. We collected choice data from 314 participants.
Backup invitations were not enough to compensate for no-shows in NTT (60 par-
ticipants) and LDT (62 participants). The average participant was slightly older
than 24 years and was on her 6th semester of studies. 53.5 % of the sample was
female.
3 Model Predictions and Hypotheses
We derive predictions contingent on the contract remedy from a formal model. Our
predictions concern both A’s effort decision aA and the likelihood of P selecting
aP D in. Note that A’s effort choice depends on P’s decision.
To summarize our modified version of the trust game (see formal description at





OP if aP D out;
…FP if aP D in and s D F;
…SP if aP D in and s D S;
with …FP < OP < …
S
P , and A’s payoffs as
…A.aA/ D
´
OA if aP D out;
OA Cw ‰.aA/ if aP D in;
with ‰.aA/ < w, such that the participation constraint is satisfied. Moreover, we
assume that cooperation would be socially beneficial, i.e.,
OP COA < q.aA/…SP C .1q.aA//…FP COA Cw ‰.aA/:
Given standard preferences, our modified trust game exhibits the common
dilemma character. Assume that A is risk-averse and generates utility from income
with a twice differentiable utility function u./, with u0./ > 0, u00./  0 (concavity).
Given aP D in, A maximizes u.OA Cw ‰.aA//. As cost increases in effort but the
remaining payoff components are effort-independent, A provides the lowest effort
level e0 (moral hazard). P anticipates A’s choice and plays aP D out if, and only if,
her expected benefit when aP D e0 is less than from her outside option, i.e.,
(1) q.e0/u.…SP /C .1q.e0//u.…FP / < u.OP/:
For the remainder of the paper and in anticipation of the experiment’s parametriza-
tion, we assume that the expression (1) holds.7 The resulting unique backward-
induction solution .out;e0/ is inefficient.
7 An assumption to the contrary would be rather uninteresting, as aP D in would be-
come a strictly dominant strategy for P. The players would not face a social dilemma.
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3.1 Base Game and Reciprocity Motives
For the remainder of the paper, we do not confine ourselves to standard preferences.
Economists have recently begun explicitly modeling that people care about other
people (other-regarding preferences). To update standard preferences in our model,
we focus on nonstrategic reciprocity motives. Theoretical models (e.g., Rabin,
1993; Levine, 1998; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher,
2006), backed up by experimental evidence (e.g., Bellemare and Kröger, 2007;
Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt, 2007; Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2008) show that reci-
procity motives strongly influence individual decision-making.
In the present model, we specifically build upon previous work of Cox, Fried-
man, and Gjerstad (2007) and Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008). Assume that A’s
utility function depends on her own material payoff as well as P’s payoff. We term
the share of P’s payoff that A cares about her reciprocity concern. Moreover, A de-
rives utility from P’s payoff depending on her reciprocity motive .8 Formally, an










Through the reciprocity motive , other-regarding preferences depend on the
previous behavior of and the set of alternative actions available to P. Following Cox,
Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007), we formalize the reciprocity motive with .aP/ D
m.aP/m0, where m.aP/ is the maximum payoff that A can guarantee herself given
P’s choice, and m0 is A’s payoff given some neutral reference decision by P. In the
base game, aP D out appears as a reasonable reference decision by P. Therefore,
we specify .aP/jaPDin D w  ‰.e0/ > 0 and .aP/jaPDout D 0 for the base game.
If P chooses to contract with A, A will derive utility from increasing P’s payoff
(positive reciprocity). By contrast, reciprocity concerns do not motivate A’s choice
when P declines to hire A. Differentiating (2) with respect to aA yields the first-
order condition
(3) 0 D u0.…A.aA//‰0.aA/Cq0.aA/…P:
This equation illustrates that A’s marginal costs from increasing effort are off-
set by her marginal utility from reciprocating in kind when P invests in execut-
ing the project. Therefore, A will deviate from the lowest possible effort choice e0
when she holds sufficiently high reciprocity motives. If P anticipates a high enough
reciprocity-induced effort choice, she will choose aP D in and cooperation will pre-
vail. In contrast to the moral-hazard result under standard preferences, (3) serves
as a benchmark for the predictions regarding our treatments.
8 The influence of multiple different other-regarding motives can be linked to the
agent’s utility function using the agent’s emotional state  . In this way Cox, Friedman,
and Gjerstad (2007) model the influence of both reciprocity motives and status concerns.
As students participate anonymously in our experiment, we rule out status concerns and
focus solely on reciprocity motives.
(2017) The Moral-Hazard Effect of Liquidated Damages 9
3.2 Predictions under Exogenous Damages
We analyze how our predictions change from the benchmark in (3) when either
the legal system provides a damage remedy (exogenous), e.g., through statutory
law, or the principal stipulates a damage remedy in the contract (endogenous). This
section considers the exogenous case.
Except for NTT, exogenous damage remedies expand P’s choice set by another
stage following A’s effort choice (ex post): if the project fails and …FP occurs, P can
claim damages, d 2 ¹0;1º. Claiming damages results in a transfer of money from A
to P. Let X be the monetary amount of the damage award. Crucially, when such a
remedy is available, A’s payoff also depends on the success or failure of the project,
i.e., the remedy establishes an incentive constraint. Note that this additional stage
is similar to the option to steal in some extensions of dictator games (e.g., List,
2007; Bardsley, 2008) or the first stage in the power-to-take game (Bosman and
van Winden, 2002). In contrast to the power-to-take game, however, we omit the
responders’ ability to punish.9 We assume thus that the claim will be perfectly
enforced, because we seek to understand the effect of different remedies and not
of enforcement characteristics of the legal system. Note that in the present game,
claiming damages (d D 1) is a dominant strategy for a rational principal.
To derive predictions for NTT, we introduce a mere payoff reduction in A’s ob-
jective function: when the project fails, a payoff reduction of X will automatically








In contrast with the benchmark case in (2), introducing a payoff reduction does
not affect A’s reciprocity concern. No transfer takes place from A to P. However,
the payoff reduction reduces the maximum payoff that A can guarantee herself
given P’s choice. Consequently, we define the reciprocity motive as .aP/jaPDin D











In comparison to the benchmark in (3), the first term of (5) is new: it captures
A’s utility from avoiding the payoff reduction by marginally increasing the project’s
9 We want to emphasize another crucial difference. The aforementioned games are
purely altruistic games in that first-mover decisions are driven by other-regarding mo-
tives. In our game, however, the decision to claim damages may be driven not only by
preferences over payoff distributions, but also by subjective inferences about other’s be-
havior (the effort choice) from an imperfect signal (the outcome).
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probability of success through exerting effort. The second term of (5) captures the
expected marginal disutility of increasing effort. This component is higher than the
marginal disutility in (3). The third term captures again the marginal utility from
reciprocating. Remember that the reciprocity motive .aP/jaPDin is smaller than in
the base case, and thus the third term is smaller. Altogether, the effect of introducing
a payoff reduction in case of project failure is ambiguous. While the first term
of (3) speaks for an increase of effort in comparison to BASE, the second and third
terms suggest that effort levels may be lower. Treatment NTT, therefore, serves
as an interesting test case: either the mere payoff reduction crowds out reciprocal
behavior sufficiently to reduce effort overall, or the monetary disincentive is strong
enough to increase A’s effort selection in NTT beyond effort levels in BASE. We
are confident that the incentives work and predict that A will choose higher effort
levels. In turn, P knows that A will suffer a payoff reduction if the project fails. We
predict that P will anticipate A’s selecting higher effort levels to avoid the payoff
reduction. Regarding A’s effort choice and the frequency of P investing into the
project, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1 In NTT, (a) players A on average select higher effort levels than
players A in BASE, and (b) the probability that players P choose to invest is larger
than in BASE.
We proceed by deriving predictions for fixed ex post damages. The expres-
sion (4) does not reflect the specific nature of damage payments as transfer pay-
ments. When P’s wealth changes after a damage award, the monetary transfer mat-
ters for A’s reciprocity concerns. The effect of the remedy depends on A’s belief d








Note how the exogenous damages remedy additionally affects the A’s reciprocity
concern. In comparison to NTT, the reciprocity motive  remains unchanged, how-
ever, because A can never be certain to avoid paying damages. Similar to NTT, the
reciprocity motive .aP/jaPDin is smaller when an exogenous remedy is available





Similar to (5), the first term and second term in (7) capture A’s utility from
marginally increasing the projects probability of success and her expected marginal
disutility of increasing effort, respectively. The main difference lies in the third
term, which captures A’s marginal utility from reciprocating. While A’s reciprocity
motive is the same as in (5), her reciprocity concern is smaller. Specifically, the
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share of P’s payoff that A cares about is reduced by the damage payment weighted
by A’s belief that damages will be claimed. The monetary transfer crowds out utility
from reciprocating in kind. Conversely, under fixed damages P can reduce exposure
to the failure of the project by claiming damages. Therefore, investing is less risky
for her. In fact, claiming damages is a dominant strategy. We hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2 In FDT, (a) players A on average select lower effort levels than
players A in NTT, and (b) the probability that players P choose to invest is larger
than in NTT.
In a final step, we implement the real-world problem that the damage award may
be under- or overcompensatory. We model the ensuing risky damage award with
the lottery QX D .XL;pIXH /, where XL < X , XH > X , and XL;XH > 0. To establish
comparability to the other cases, we fix EŒ QX D X . Moreover, claiming the remedy

















Note that the risky nature of the damage award does not affect A’s reciprocity
motive . While A can affect the likelihood of project failure, she cannot influence
the occurrence of XL or XH specifically. The maximum payoff she can guarantee
herself is OA Cw ‰.aA/EŒ QX D OA Cw ‰.aA/X when aP D in. Therefore,
we propose that the reciprocity motive  does not depend on whether the damage




























To derive hypotheses about the influence of risky damage awards, we com-
pare (9) with the fixed-damages case in (7). A’s utility from marginally increas-
ing the project’s probability of success (first term) is larger than under fixed dam-
ages, because pu./C .1p/u./ < u.EŒ/ when u0./ > 0, u00./  0. Risk-averse
agents will take greater strides to avoid paying damages when the damage award
can be under- or overcompensatory. A’s expected marginal disutilty of increasing
effort (second term) is equal to the corresponding term in (7), because pu0./ C
.1p/u0./ D u0.EŒ/ when u./ is twice differentiable. Finally, the marginal utility
from reciprocating (third term) is also unaffected by the damage lottery. While
the reciprocity concern is identical in both (9) and (7), i.e., …P  d EŒ QX D
…P  d X , we have argued that the reciprocity motive  is independent of the
risky nature of the damage award.
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To sum up, utility from marginally increasing the project’s probability of success
will motivate an agent to exert more effort when damage awards can be under- or
overcompensatory. Simultaneously, the expected marginal disutilities from increas-
ing effort and reciprocity-induced marginal utility are unchanged. Independent of
the risk nature of the damage award, however, claiming damages is a dominant
strategy that reduces P’s exposure to project failure. We hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3 In RDT, (a) players A on average select higher effort levels than
players A in FDT, and (b) the probability that players P choose to invest is higher
than in NTT.
3.3 Predictions under Endogenous Damages
This subsection considers the effect of an endogenous damage remedy. When an
endogenous stipulation of damages is possible, P’s choice set additionally expands
ex ante: prior to P’s investment choice, she can contractually stipulate a damage
payment in case of project failure, c 2 ¹0;1º. A observes P’s decisions whether to
stipulate and whether to invest and then selects her effort level. As in the case of ex-
ogenous damage remedies, P can ex post enforce (stipulated) damages contingent
on the failure of the project. Note that stipulating damages is a dominant strategy











While the difference between (6) and (10) appears almost inconsequential, we
argue that a strong difference between the different mechanisms lies in A’s reci-
procity motive . Remember that  is a function of A’s maximum payoff that she
can guarantee herself given P’s choice, less her payoff given some neutral refer-
ence decision. While all exogenous remedies affected the former, we argue that a
stipulated damage mechanism will additionally affect the latter. What is the neutral
reference decision under stipulated damages? Prior research consistently finds that
choices are menu-dependent. For instance, in different proposer–responder games,
responders reject allocations favoring the proposer more often when a fair alloca-
tion is possible than when the proposer’s choice set was restricted to unfair dis-
tributions (e.g., Güth, Huck, and Müller, 2001; Bolton, Brandts, and Ockenfels,
2005; Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2005). Therefore, we propose that introducing
the ex ante choice to stipulate damages shifts P’s neutral reference decision as per-
ceived by A to ¹aP D in;c D 0º when P stipulates damages. Moreover, Cox, Fried-
man, and Sadiraj (2008, p. 40) propose that second movers will “respond more
strongly to [. . . ] choices that overturn the status quo than to those that uphold it or
that involve no real choice by the first mover.” Cox, Servátka, and Vadovič (2016)
find supporting evidence for this claim. When P refrains from stipulating damages,
we thus propose aP D out as neutral reference decision. In other words, an omitted
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action is not salient enough to change P’s reference decision as perceived by A.





0 for aP D out;
w ‰.e0/ for aP D in;c D 0;
X for aP D in;c D 1:
Note that, given aP D in, the reciprocity motive  is negative when P chooses to
stipulate damages and positive when she does not. This is in stark contrast to fixed












This expression is almost the same as (7). However, when P chooses to stipulate
a damage payment, A will suffer disutility from reciprocating. As marginally in-
creasing effort imposes psychological costs, we predict that A will reduce her effort
level. By contrast, stipulating and enforcing stipulated damages is a dominant strat-
egy that reduces P’s exposure to project failure. We hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4 In LDT, (a) when player P chooses to stipulate a transfer payment,
players A on average select lower effort levels than players A in FDT, and (b) the
probability that players P choose to invest is higher than in NTT.
4 Results
4.1 Effort Levels
We first analyze the effort levels chosen by players A. Figure 2 depicts the relative
frequency of effort decisions per treatment. Compared to BASE, effort levels in
NTT and FDT appear to be higher, whereas effort levels in LDT appear to be lower.
However, discerning from Figure 2 a clear difference across effort levels between
BASE and RDT is more difficult.
Table 1 provides quantitative information about differences in effort-level
choices across treatments by reporting the mean, standard deviation, and median
of such choices.The descriptive statistics support the observations from Figure 2:
compared to BASE, mean and median effort-level choices are (1) higher in NTT
and FDT, (2) lower in LDT, and (3) about equal in RDT.
To examine whether the differences are statistically meaningful and test our
research hypotheses, we conduct one-sided Fisher–Pitman permutation tests. Ac-
cording to Hypothesis 1(a), players A in NTT on average select higher effort levels
than players A in BASE. Table 1 supports this result. We reject the null that the dis-
tribution of effort-level choices in NTT is smaller than or equal to the distribution
of effort-level choices in BASE (Z D 1:9113, p D 0:0346).
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Figure 2
Effort Choices by Treatment
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Table 1
Location and Dispersion of Effort Choices
Treatments
BASE NTT FDT LDT RDT
Mean 2.25 2.90 2.72 1.97 2.31
Std. dev. 1.16 1.45 1.30 1.22 1.06
Median 2 3 3 1 2
Moreover, in Hypothesis 2(a) we predict that players A in FDT on average select
lower effort levels than players A in NTT. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 do
not provide a clear indication: while the mean effort choice in FDT is smaller than
in NTT, the median effort choice is the same in both treatments. In fact, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that effort-level choices in FDT and NTT are equally
distributed (Z D 0:52245, p D 0:3275). Insofar as effort-level choices between
FDT and NTT are different, this difference is not statistically meaningful.
We proceed with Hypothesis 3(a), which predicts that players A in RDT on
average select higher effort levels than players A in FDT. We derived this prediction
mainly based on the assumption that agents are risk-averse. Somewhat surprisingly,
Table 1 suggests a contrary result, as both mean and median effort-level choices are
smaller in RDT than in FDT. Consequently, we also cannot reject the null that the
distribution of effort-level choices in RDT is smaller than or equal to that in FDT
(Z D 1:3597, p D 0:9297). In fact, we achieve a contrary result in that effort-level
choices in RDT are almost significantly smaller than in FDT.
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Finally, we turn to our last prediction regarding effort-level choices. Hypothe-
sis 4(a) holds that players A in LDT on average select lower effort levels (when
player P chose to stipulate the transfer payment) than players A in FDT.10 The de-
scriptive statistics in Table 1 clearly support the prediction. Indeed, we reject the
null that the distribution of effort-level choices in LDT is larger than or equal to
that in FDT (one-sided: Z D 1:427, p D 0:0957).
To control for individual-specific characteristics, we estimate treatment effects
on effort-level choices with ordered probit models. The different treatments enter
the estimation as a dummy variable. We obtain control variables from our posttests
and the sociodemographic data on our participants. For each hypothesis, the left
panel of Table 2 reports the results of the estimation with the highest quality as
measured by the Akaike information criterion (AIC).The results resonate with the
results from the Fisher–Pitman permutation tests. In comparison to BASE, NTT has
a significantly positive effect on effort-level choices. In comparison to NTT, a fixed
transfer payment in FDT has no significant effect on effort-level choices. Similarly,
introducing a risky transfer payment in RDT does not lead to significantly higher
effort-level choices than does a certain transfer payment in FDT. However, when in
LDT players P ex ante stipulate the transfer payment, players A select significantly
lower effort levels than for certain ex post transfer payments in FDT.11
4.2 Investment Decisions
We next turn to the frequency of investment choices of players P. Figure 3 depicts
investment choices of players P per treatment. While the frequency of investment
is similar without any remedy in BASE (53.13 %) and with a payment reduction in
NTT (60.00 %), the frequency of players P investing spikes to nearly 100 % as soon
as any form of transfer payment is introduced in FDT (90.63 %), in LDT (93.75 %),
and in RDT (93.55 %).
To analyze the treatment effects on the probability of player P investing, we es-
timate both a linear probability model and a logit model. We use the same control
variables as before. Using NTT as reference treatment allows us to gauge simul-
taneously whether investment choices in BASE are less frequent than in NTT and
whether investment choices in each of FDT, LDT, and RDT are more frequent than
in NTT.
The right panel of Table 2 reports results of the linear estimation and average
marginal effects of the logit estimation. Compared to treatment NTT, both estima-
tions yield a strong and significant positive effect on the probability that players P
choose to transact with players A for treatments FDT, LDT, and RDT. This result
10 All players A in the LDT treatment chose to stipulate the transfer payment, and
therefore we do not need to split the data set.
11 Appendix C (online) contains two robustness checks. The results indicate that
(1) the positive effect of NTT compared to BASE is driven by players A more frequently
selecting the two highest effort levels and that (2) the negative effect of LDT compared
to FDT is driven by players A more often selecting the lowest effort level.
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Table 2
Summary of Regression Analysis
Effort level Investment frequency
Hypotheses 1(a) 2(a) 3(a) 4(a) 1(b) to 4(b)
Reference treat-
ment BASE NTT FDT NTT
(ordered probit) (LPM) (logit AMEs)
BASE – – – – 0:073 0:025
(0.095) (0.082)
NTT 0:574 – – – – –
(0.319)
FDT – 0:006 – – 0:307 0:222
(0.320) (0.095) (0.062)
LDT – – – 0:355 0:336 0:241
(0.215) (0.096) (0.056)
RDT – – 0:390 – 0:335 0:243
(0.300) (0.095) (0.059)
Age 0:068 – – – 0:011 0:010
(0.040) (0.006) (0.006)
Male – – – – – –
Risk 0:184 0:028 0:028 0:076 – –
aversion (0.086) (0.086) (0.079) (0.082)
Ambiguity 0.028 0.047 0.037 – – 0.001
aversion (0.039) (0.035) (0.029) (0.001)
SVO type 0:540 – 0:549 – – –
(0.341) (0.347)
(Intercept) – – – – 0:855 –
(0.166)
Res. Dev. 154.305 141.685 151.819 158.417 – 124.738
AIC 172.305 155.685 167.819 174.417 – 138.738
Res. SE – – – – 0.375 –
Adj. R2 – – – – 0.176 –
Note:  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
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is in line with our Hypotheses 2(b), 3(b), and 4(b). However, contrary to Hypothe-
sis 1(b), the probability that players P in BASE chose to invest is not significantly
lower than in NTT.
4.3 Point Earnings in the Main Task
Given (1) the increased frequency of investment in the FDT and LDT conditions
as compared to the BASE and NTT conditions and (2) the differences of effort
levels across FDT and LDT, we next examine the point earnings of players A and
P obtained during the main task. Specifically, we examine pairs of players that
involved a positive investment decision of player P. Players A in FDT earn 622.75
points on average, and players A in LDT earn 632.41 points on average. Based on
the results of a two-sided Fisher–Pitman permutation test, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the distribution of point earnings of players A is equal in FDT and
LDT (Z D 0:1891, p D 0:8616). Therefore, players A earn the same number of
points across these treatments.
Players P in FDT earn 751.72 points on average. However, players P in LDT
only earn 641.38 points on average. In fact, a two-sided Fisher–Pitman permutation
test leads us to reject the hypotheses that point earnings of players P are equally
distributed between FDT and LDT (Z D 2:0741, p D 0:0647). We conclude that
players P in LDT earn significantly less points than players P in FDT.
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5 Discussion
The early economic literature identified various benefits of contracting for damage
measures. Liquidated-damages clauses have been recognized as insuring buyers
against nonperformance (Goetz and Scott, 1977), enabling screening buyers with
unobservable valuations (Schwartz, 1990; Stole, 1992), preventing overinvestments
(Cooter, 1985), and preventing entry by competitors (Chung, 1992; Aghion and
Bolton, 1987).12 A second strand of literature highlighted the potential role of stip-
ulating sanctions as a means for inducing efficient cooperative investments (Edlin,
1996; Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996; Hart and Moore, 1999; Maskin and Tirole,
1999).
Recent contributions focus on the effect of party-stipulated remedies on the in-
terpersonal dynamics and normative understandings about contract breach (Wil-
kinson-Ryan and Baron, 2009). Experimental findings suggest, for instance, that
the presence of liquidated-damages clauses may crowd out contracting parties’
moral resistance to contract breach (Wilkinson-Ryan, 2010).
In line with this more recent research, the theory, model, and experiment in this
article build on the common observation that people also have other-regarding,
nonmonetary preferences. To that end, our model assumes that contracting parties’
utility function reflects reciprocal concerns.
As we predicted, the findings suggest that when sanctions for uncooperative be-
havior are formalized by one of the parties, this degrades the interpersonal dynamic
between the contracting parties. The results indicate that stipulating sanctions for
breach not only erodes the interpersonal trust and positive reciprocity, but actu-
ally goes so far as tipping the reciprocity motive, inducing negative reactions by
the other party, whose behavior becomes subject to moral hazard. One possible in-
terpretation is that when a contracting party specifies or formalizes sanctions for
uncooperative behavior ahead of time, this makes the expectation of breach more
salient, signaling a lack of trust in the agent. In this regard, inserting a liquidated-
damages clause reduces the agent’s effort in completing the contract.
Our findings suggest that the adverse reaction by agents to liquidated damages
is triggered by the stipulation of the damage remedy by the principal, not by prin-
cipals’ pending decision to claim damages. First, the principal’s decision to initiate
a transfer payment for nonperformance takes place after the agent has selected his
or her effort level. Second, although our FDT treatment incorporates an identical
ex post claiming stage, we do not observe any adverse reaction by agents there.
An interesting finding that runs through our results is that principals fail to an-
ticipate the eroding effect of stipulating damages on cooperative behavior. To the
contrary, implementing a damage payment appears to evoke a sense of security
among principals indistinguishable from the exogenously provided damage reme-
dies. This confidence seems unwarranted given the reduced effort levels. It suggests
12 Spier and Whinston (1995) demonstrate that the efficiency advantages of penalty
clauses can disappear on taking into account renegotiation and potential overinvestments.
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a lack of anticipation and empathy on behalf of participants. Our data indicates that
this failure is a source of inefficiency. Agents in LDT earn as many points in the
main task as their colleagues in FDT, but by relying on the false security of a
liquidated-damages clause, principals in LDT earn significantly less points than in
FDT. Overall, the results from our study suggest that when stipulating damages,
contracting parties attain less cooperative surplus than when they are subject to an
exogenously imposed remedy.
Although our experimental design incorporates several real-world contracting
features, we stylized a number of aspects in order to implement the setting in the
laboratory. First, while the BASE treatment (no compensation) is the background to
all treatments, in most legal settings expectation damages or specific performance
is the default if parties do not include a damage stipulation in the contract.
This difference affects the results in at least two possible ways. On the one hand,
the material effect of a liquidated-damages clause is of course more substantial than
in a real-world setting, where the difference between privately stipulated damages
and expectation damages is expected to be more minor, especially given the legal
restrictions on punitive sanctions in contract law observed in most legal systems.
On the other hand, in our experimental setting the principal’s decision to include a
liquidated-damages clause is quite reasonable in light of the lack of any protection
against breach in the alternative. By contrast, insisting on a liquidated-damages
clause might be perceived as a stronger signal of distrust if the default legal back-
ground already protects the expectation interest of the principal. In this regard, our
findings might in fact be stronger in real-world settings where liquidated-damages
clauses depart from a default that is more protective than in our experimental set-
ting.
Second, in our experimental setting the principal unilaterally sets the liquidated-
damages award. In many real-world situations, of course, liquidated-damages
clauses result from bilateral negotiations between contracting parties. Negative
reciprocity likely will be less pronounced when liquidated-damages awards are the
result of fair, even-handed negotiations. Note however that the liquidated-damages
clause in our treatment merely reflect the expectation damage award – fully in
line with the more restrictive legal doctrine that restricts liquidated-damages stip-
ulations to amounts that reflect expectation damages in situation when proving
harm might be burdensome. In any event, our results emphasize the importance for
promisees to engage in a fair bargaining over damage clauses in order to avoid the
adverse effects documented in this article.
6 Conclusion
Recent evidence suggests that liquidated-damages clauses provide efficiency ad-
vantages by crowding out contracting parties’ deontological concerns about effi-
cient breach. In this paper we highlight an important downside to ex ante damage
stipulations by parties. Based on findings obtained in a controlled laboratory exper-
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iment, we suggest that express damage stipulations trigger negative reciprocity and
moral hazard, reducing performance by contract promisors. Such negative effects
are absent when damages are exogenously imposed.
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